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France is presenting its current involvement in the Sahel as a new, and 
more multilateral, form of intervention. 
But is it? Does it mark a clean break with France’s early postcolonial past, 
characterised by unilateral intervention practices? Or does it, thanks to a 
process called ‘layering’, superimpose and meld together old unilateral 
intervention practices with the ‘newer’ multilateral approach? 
In looking for answers to these questions, we are reminded of the quotation 
by management consultant Peter Drucker, namely that 
If you want to do something new, you have to stop doing something old. 
This observation seems to be the key to understanding the novelty or 
otherwise of France’s actions in the Sahel. Thus, before searching for the 
‘new’, we need to look back and identify the ‘old’. 
France of old 
France traditionally sees itself as the self-appointed ‘gendarme of Africa’. It 
has intervened militarily on the continent at least 30 times over the early 
postcolonial decades. This was possible thanks to its pre-positioned 
troops based in Africa and French readiness to intervene. Bilateral military 
and defence agreements signed with a number of former French colonies in 
Africa after independence provided the legal basis for intervention. 
Until the 1990s, French military interventions were mostly unilateral and 
accompanied by the practice of self-legitimation. In other words, 
interventions were conducted according to French interpretations of 
security. They aimed to defend imperilled African heads of state at the 
discretion of the French president against any threat to the regime. The 
rules of engagement and levels of force deployed were determined by 
France without reference to external legitimating authorities. France alone 
decided on the remit of its operations, which almost always took place 
within the borders of sovereign African states. 
The end of the Cold War and France’s role in Rwanda marked a major 
turning point for French military policy in Africa. Paris, as the key 
international supporter of the Juvenal Habyarimana regime that was 
responsible for the 1994 Rwandan genocide, was widely criticised for its 
role in the run-up to the genocide, during which up to a million Rwandans, 
mainly Tutsis, were slaughtered by the Hutu majority. It was also criticised 
for Operation Turquoise in the immediate aftermath of the genocide. Many 
critics believed that this ‘humanitarian’ operation was less about saving 
lives than providing those who had been involved in the genocide with an 
escape route into eastern Zaire. 
As a result, France shifted from a policy of unilateral intervention to a 
multilateral approach. Partly this was because of the need to share the 
political risks of intervention following international criticism of the 
military’s role in Rwanda. But it was also partly driven by resource 
considerations. France no longer had either the money or the personnel to 
sustain its old unilateral approach and so needed to share the burden. 
‘New interventionism’ 
Twenty years later, how real is multilateral France’s ‘new interventionism’? 
To be sure there has been a shift away from self-legitimation. France has 
come to accept that interventions need to be mandated by international 
bodies such as the UN Security Council. And that ideally there should also 
be approval from regional bodies such as the European Union or the 
Economic Community of West African States. 
It has also come to accept rules set by bodies such as the UN Security 
Council and by troop contributing countries on a range of fronts. These 
include the conduct of missions, length of operations and use of violence. 
Yet older style unilateral interventionism has never been too far from the 
surface. One example was French actions in Côte d’Ivoire between 1999 and 
2011. 
And today France is unquestionably the pivotal actor within the assemblage 
of external interveners in the Sahel. Its Operation Barkhane involves the 
deployment of over 5,000 troops to fight terrorism in five francophone 
countries of the western Sahel – Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and 
Chad – and in the Lake Chad Basin. The new elements are the efforts to 
obtain international approval, the cross-regional approach and the 
coalition-building focus. 
Within this coalition each player has adopted a primary role. France’s 
Operation Barkhane focuses on active and potentially lethal, on-the-ground 
counterterrorism operations. For its part, the United Nations 
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali supports 
political processes and reconciliation. And the European Union Training 
Mission Mali and the European Union Capacity Building Mission Sahel 
Mali focus on training the Malian army and reform of the country’s security 
sector. Finally, the G5 Sahel joint force, actively promoted and supported 
by France, undertakes counterterrorism operations in cooperation with 
French forces. 
France’s new approach continues to attract support. But one can raise 
questions over the extent to which its efforts in the Sahel can genuinely be 
considered multilateral. 
Interventions have not always received prior authorisation by the UN. Also, 
France has played a dominant role as the lead nation, thanks to its 
influential position within – or in relation to – all the various bodies 
involved. 
There remain question marks, therefore, surrounding the extent of the 
newness of the French interventions in the Sahel. Although the ‘new’ 
interventionism contains elements of multilateralism, it also involves 
practices that hark back to the old, pre-Rwanda unilateralism. 
Perhaps the clearest example of the resurgence of such old-style 
neocolonial practices was Barkhane’s bombardment, in February 2019, of 
Chadian forces opposed to President Deby’s regime. The rebels were 
advancing on the capital N’Djamena with the aim of overthrowing the 
regime of France’s old ally Idriss Deby. 
In the end, it was perhaps never realistic to assume that France would fully 
embrace the tenets of the ‘new interventionism’. Even the threat of US 
withdrawal, the relentless attacks by jihadist extremists and the onslaught 
of COVID-19 might not be enough to make France anything more than a 
reluctant multilateralist. 
 
